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PUNISHMENT
IN A FREE SOCIETYt
FREDERICK J. LUDWIG*
E VEN IF MEN WERE ANGELS, the experience of Divine Revelation
would suggest the prudence of retaining the threat of punishment
to keep them so. So long as non-angelic mortals seek pleasure and avoid
pain, punishment will play a vital role in influencing human behavior,
in intimidating actual offenders and in deterring would-be ones. But
punishment, like the infliction of any pain, as an end in itself, is an
evil. Those who insist that punishment is the just desert of crime, that
punishment must fit the crime ("an eye for an eye"), or that punish-
ment is the debt owed society by some criminal, may assert the unstudied
belief of mankind. By viewing punishment as an end, they cannot
justify its infliction. Only by considering it as a means, may punish-
ment be properly evaluated. In this light, punishment is just or unjust
in proportion as it serves or disserves the attainment of a good end.
Punishment imposed to prevent crime promotes the common good, and
is accordingly just. Punishment inflicted for the sake of vengeance, retri-
bution, or sadistic satisfaction, promotes no common good, and is unjust.
Those who would substitute lenient for punitive treatment of criminals,
argue that the deterrent efficacy of threats of punishment is overrated.
They insist that crime continues in spite of the threats because criminals
seldom look ahead to the possible consequences of their lawless acts.
How much greater the crime rate would be without such threats must
remain conjectural: no society has yet been foolhardy enough to experi-
ment with suspension of penalties for crime. As to the effect of such
threats on criminals, this writer could only wish that his students, after
a semester of exposure to criminal law materials, would acquire the
ready grasp of subtle distinctions among various degrees of burglary
tThe author has in substance reproduced a sentence or two from his writing, Peti-
tion in the Matter of the Imprisonment of Archibishop Stepinac to the President
of the United States (1946).
*A.B., M.S., College of the City of New York; LL.B., Columbia University.
and the mastery of the tangled skein of the
law of sentencing second offenders that
goes with the acumen of a second-story
man who has spent some time in prison.
Those who would lessen the severity of
punishment argue historically that crime
in fact increased when penalties were most
severe. It is of course true that penalties
were severe and crime flourished prior to
nineteenth century reforms, and this was
especially so in England. As late as 1819,
no fewer than 220 crimes were capitally
punished. Most of these crimes, however,
were "clergyable," i.e., subject to respite
from- the death penalty. In days before
uniform crime reporting, a Select Commit-
tee of Parliament attributed 72,000 execu-
tions for robbery and theft alone to the
reign of Henry VIII. Yet during the time
when picking pockets was punished by
death, a good harvest was reaped by pick-
pockets who plied their trade among crowds
at public executions as they gazed skyward
at the hangman's noose. But the efficacy
of punishment in preventing crime depends
primarily upon the certainty of infliction,
and only secondarily upon its severity. The
abolition of brutal punishment happened to
be followed by the. disappearance of the
armed footpads that infested the highways
to London. It would be post hoc ergo prop-
ter hoc reasoning simply to attribute this
amelioration to lessened severity of penal-
ties. The establishment for the first time in
1829 of a professional police force assured
a measure of certainty in criminal law en-
forcement theretofore unknown. It was that
certainty that emboldened the House of
Commons in 1832 to test the thesis that
certainty, and not severity, was the im-
portant ingredient in deterrence by adopt-
ing the humanitarian reforms abolishing
the death penalty for all but four offenses.
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Punishment in Free and Totalitarian
Societies
The major concern of a free society with
punishment is that a fair trial precede its
infliction. This concern involves resolution
of two weighty interests: on the one hand,
convicting the guilty and preventing crime;
on the other, acquitting the innocent and
protecting fundamental rights of the indi-
vidual. In our society the interest of pre-
venting crime has assumed considerable
magnitude. Major crime in the United
States has increased twice as fast as the
population since 1940. For seven years
in a row, the two million mark has been
exceeded for the more serious crimes (hom-
icides, robberies, aggravated assaults, bur-
glaries, rapes, and larcenies). But the interest
in acquitting the innocent and protecting
fundamental rights is the crucial one that
differentiates a free from a totalitarian so-
ciety. This interest postulates man as a
creature of God. As such, man, and not
government, is the measure of things. Gov-
ernment's image of man must be that of
a creature with spirituality, uniqueness,
and dignity. Man's image of government
must be that of a means to the attainment
of the ends for which he was created. In
this ordering of affairs, government is a
limited, and not an exclusive, means. Gov-
ernment cannot be the end of man and shall
not subsume the total sphere of his exist-
ence.
Dialectical materialism, the official doc-
trine of communism, views man and his re-
lationship to government in a different
penumbra. Man is a simple, undiversified
product of economic forces. Lacking Divine
authorship, man naturally lacks spirituality,
uniqueness, and dignity. Man is objective
and can be no mystery. The most that can
be said for his individuality is that he is
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an undifferentiated part of the mass. This
mass man must conform or perish. He must
conform to the official theology (atheism),
philosophy (dialectical materialism), art,
science, or what-have-you, of communism.
In short, this piece of protoplasm is either
a means to the end of the attainment of one
or another five-year plan, or he is an enemy
of the people. In this order of things, there
can be no room for human, individual, or
personal rights.
Once upon a time, if the accused could
walk blindfolded and barefoot over nine
red-hot ploughshares laid lengthwise at
equal distances without being scorched, he
was entitled to acquittal. Otherwise, as
usually was the case, he was condemned as
guilty. One by one with the passing centu-
ries, the ancient ordeals by fire, water, and
battle, have been abandoned. In the course
of centuries, they have ceased to command
confidence as sound methods of resolving
disputed issues of fact. Their recrudes-
cence, in the form of the twentieth century
totalitarian trial of Archbishop Aloysius
Stepinac, indicates that some of the progress
of mankind is illusory.
Archbishop Stepinac was sentenced in
1946 to sixteen years of forced labor with
confiscation of all property, and loss of civil
rights for an additional five years. Cardinal
Stepinac passed away this year. The indict-
ment by the Public Prosecutor charged the
Archbishop with collaborating with the
regimes of occupying nations and with an
independent nationalist movement during
World War II, and participating in forced
conversions to Roman Catholicism of vari-
ous Yugoslav groups. The nature of these
charges, their historic background, the mo-
tivation of a new Balkan government in
ordering them made, and the evidence ex-
isting to refute them as well as that con-
trived in their support, have been discussed
elsewhere.' Our focus is on the method of
trying the disputed issues of fact, and
fundamental standards of fairness de-
manded by the civilized practice of man-
kind in criminal trials.
The trial of Archbishop Stepinac offers
the lawyer of the Western World, and par-
ticularly the Anglo-American practitioner,
an almost unique catalogue of fundamental
rights disregarded by governmental action
to inflict punishment on a human being.
Pre-trial by Government-controlled
Press "
One year before the trial of the Arch-
bishop, a Pastoral Letter of the Yugoslav
Hierarchy accused the government of wide-
spread persecution of the Church.2 The
Letter noted the religious victims: 269
dead, 169 in prisons and concentration
camps, and 89 missing. Protest was made
of the confiscation of Church property, the
closing of religious seminaries, convents
and schools, and the abolition of the reli-
gious press. The Yugoslav embassy in Wash-
ington in 1946,3 and a group of Protestant
clergymen and editors who visited Yugo-
slavia as guests of that government in
1947, 4 have denied such persecution. But
in 1947, the non-Catholic Serbian Bishop
of Dalmatia complained at length of even
more drastic persecution of his Orthodox
1 Cavalli, 11 processo dell'Arcivescovo di Zaga-
bria, LA CIVILTA CATrOLICA (Rome, 1947); MAR-
TIRIUM CROATIAE (Rome, 1946); MIGLIORATI, LA
CHIESA NELLA REPUBBLICA FEDERATIVA POPOLARE
JUGOSLAVA (Rome, 1946); PATrEE, THE CASE OF
CARDINAL ALOYS1US STEPINAC (1953).
2 PATTEE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 470-80.
3 The Case of Archbishop Stepinac, Pamphlet,
Embassy of the Federal Peoples Republic of Yugo-
slavia, Washington, D.C., 1946.
4 Religion in Yugoslavia, Pamphlet, 1947.
Church. "Though the communist regime
has set out to destroy all religion and all
belief in God, it would be no exaggeration
to say that at the present time the Orthodox
Church is being even more severely perse-
cuted than the Catholic." 5
A series of attacks on the Archbishop,
whose name headed hierarchal signers of
the Letter, was initiated in the Zagreb
newspaper, Vijestnik.6 By January 1946,
this campaign assumed sufficient proportion
to warrant comment by Randolph Church-
hill, a British observer, that "the Yugo-
slav propaganda against the Archbishop
has only one purpose, i.e., to prepare his
trial."'7 Eight months later, on the day of
the indictment of the Archbishop, Vijestnik
denounced him as the:
supreme head of all the dark and bloody
crimes committed by (pro-fascist bands).
. . .Stepinatz will answer for the heavy
crimes he committed during the occupation
and since Yugoslavia's liberation. He is re-
sponsible for close four-year collaboration
with the enemy. He is responsible for the
protection of Ustashi slaughterers, for "dip-
lomatic" activity before the collapse of the
Croat independent State, for the episcopal
letter directed against the national libera-
tion struggle and for the anti-national spirit
that he propagated as supreme head of the
church among his subordinates.8
The remaining Zagreb papers and the pro-
vincial Croatian press joined in a concerted
editorial attack on the Archbishop. 9
In the Anglo-American press, free from
governmental dictate, comment on crimi-
nal cases pending before a jury sometimes
adversely affects the rights of a defendant.
5 N. Y. Times, Aug. 23, 1947, p. 14, col. 5.
6 See, e.g., Dec. 19, 1945; Dec. 21, 1945; Jan. 1,
1946; Jan. 19, 1946; Jan. 26, 1946.
7 London Daily Telegraph, Jan. 23, 1946.
s N. Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1946, p. 4, col. 5.
9 N. Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1946, p. 2, col. 3.
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Under a totalitarian regime, when the press
is an arm of government, the effect of ad-
verse comment on a defendant is utterly
fatal. This is certainly so when the triers
of fact are not a jury of laymen recruited
from the community at large, but rather a
few full-time designees paid by the regime
in power. But it is especially the case when
mass media that might conceivably support
the defendant are totally suppressed. The
attack on the Archbishop in the govern-
ment controlled press and radio coincided
with the suppression of Catholic publica-
tions in Yugoslavia.
Mob Domination of Trial
In the wake of the press and radio cam-
paign came the mass demonstrations and
circulation of petitions against the Arch-
bishop. These were staged and organized
as can be done only in a totalitarian state.
They were timed for the day of indictment,
and again for the opening of trial. The
courtroom audience, admitted only by
ticket by the OZNA (national secret po-
lice), were well screened to maintain the
atmosphere of hysteria and hostility. A
symphony of hisses accompanied the read-
ing by the court of a prejudicial (and quite
hearsay) article describing the Archbishop's
alleged collaboration with an independent
Croatian movement. 10 A cacophony of jeers
repeatedly interrupted the Archbishop in
his brief thirty-eight minute defense ad-
dress." 1
Biased Tribunal
Whatever the system of jurisprudence,
the minimum standard for a fair trial is
notice and hearing on the merits before an
10 N. Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1946, p. 14, col. 1.
11 N. Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1946, p. 7, col. 2..
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impartial tribunal. The Supreme Court of
the Popular Croat Republic, one of the
so-called people's courts of the new regime,
was constituted, according to the Yugoslav
press, to render judgments that "were not
to be given by trained jurists under the
complicated laws heretofore in force but
are to be made by the best sons of the
people, not the dead letter of the written
law but by the proper, healthy conception
of the people. The judges are to be chosen
from the people."'1 2 Three judges thus
chosen conducted the trial of the Arch-
bishop - Zarko Vimpulsek, Ante Cireneo,
and Ivan Poldrugac. These were true to
the new totalitarian jurisprudence. "Fre-
quently," the London Times reported of the
examination of the Archbishop, "both the
president of the court and the prosecution
were directing so many questions at him
that he was cut off in the middle of a sen-
tence."'1 3 The prejudicial mental set of the
president was repeatedly manifested. In the
middle of the trial, he accused the Arch-
bishop, "You must have a very loose con-
science," and cried out, "Stepinac sup-
ported terrorism."'14
Denial of Assistance of Counsel
Fundamental in civilized criminal pro-
cedure to a fair hearing is that the accused
understand the proceedings. He must be
accorded time and opportunity to select
counsel and consult with them in the prep-
aration and presentation of the case. The
court rejected, for no stated reason, one of
the two attorneys designated by the Arch-
12 Slobodna Dalmacija (Zagreb), Dec. 31, 1944;
Programme et status du parti communiste de
Yougoslavie (Belgrade, 1948).
13 Oct. 2, 1946.
14 Cavalli, 11 processo dell'Arcivescovo di Zaga-
bria 37 (1947).
bishop for his defense.5 After the trial,
incidentally, the chief defense counsel, Dr.
Ivo Politeo, and two of his aides were
arrested and imprisoned. 16 A third aide
escaped to Italy. 17 The Archbishop was ar-
rested in 1946, at 6. A.M. on September
18, indicted September 23, placed on trial
on September 30, and sentenced on Oc-
tober 11. During that entire period the
Archbishop saw his counsel only once,
and then for a single hour, on September
27.18 To frustrate preparation of a defense,
not only was the Archbishop imprisoned,
but also his three closest administrative
aides were arrested, questioned, and de-
tained by the prosecution during the time
between arrest and verdict in the Arch-
bishop's case. 19
Exclusion of Defense Witnesses
Basic to a fair hearing is the right of the
accused to have his witnesses heard. The
prosecution was permitted an unlimited
number of witnesses, and indeed on one
day of the trial, October 5, 73 testified.
The defense was permitted to call only 20,
of which 14 were barred, without even
being put in the witness box before their
exclusion.20 Said the tribunal: "These wit-
nesses cannot contribute anything to mod-
ify the substance of the indictment. They
can only testify regarding details. They
might be able to show that Stepinac pro-
tected a few isolated Serbs and Jews. But
to pretend to base a defense on this would
be an intolerable effrontery in a people's
15 PATTEE, THE CASE OF CARDINAL ALOYSFUS
STEPINAC 57 (1953).
16 N. Y. Times, April 23, 1947, p. 13, col. 1.
17 Ibid.
18 PATrEE, op. cit. supra note 15, at 57.
19 Ibid.
20 PAT'EE, THE CASE OF CARDINAL ALOYSIUS
STEPINAC 62 (1953).
court."'21 The same exclusion was accorded
the documentary evidence of the defense.
An additional ground for exclusion, of de-
fense witnesses was advanced by the tri-
bumal "Fascists cannot testify on behalf
of fascists in our country. ' 22 Yet, three
former-' officials of the independent Croat
movement, all awaiting trial as "fascists,"
were permitted to testify for the prosecu-
tion .23
Retroactive and Vague Penal Laws
The concept of fair trial involves clear
notice, by the state of the conduct sought
to be punished in advance of its commis-
sion. The ex post facto principle antedates
the Romans and has been basic to every
civilized system of criminal justice in the
Western World for centuries. The Arch-
bishop was indicted under Article 13,
Paragraph 2, of the "Law on Criminal Ac-
tivities against the People and the State."'24
These statutes were drafted and put into
effect -by the new government on August
15, 1945, with subsequent amendment on
July 9, 1946. The conduct that the prose-
cutor charged to the Archbishop was al-
leged to have occurred during the four
years preceding their enactment. Con-
cededly, these statutes constituted a total
departure from those previously in effect.
As such, they were replete with political
terms having no content ascertainable in
criminal jurisprudence. To charge "trea-
son" and "conspiracy" has meaning in the
criminal courts of civil and common-law
countries; to accuse of "collaboration" of-
fers a defendant and his counsel no particu-
21 Cavalli, II processo dell'Arcivescovo di Zaga-
bria 36-37 (1947).
22 Ibid.
23 PATTEE, op cit. supra note 20, at 62.
24 Programme et status du parti communiste de
Yougoslavie (Belgrade, 1948).
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lar notice of the charge. Even prospective
application of such vague statutes would
violate fundamental rights. Retroactive ap-
plication compounded that violation in the
case of Archbishop Stepinac.
Denial of Confrontation
The Archbishop was indicted on Sep-
tember 23, 1946. Actually, his trial com-
menced two weeks before the indictment.
Eighteen defendants, twelve of them priests,
were placed on trial on September 9, 1946,
on charges of collaboration. Nine days
later, after much testimony had been taken,
an adjournment for ten days was an-
nounced. A new defendant was to be
added, the Archbishop. Thus, when the
trial resumed on September 30, with the
Archbishop as defendant for the first time,
much of the evidence against the new
target of the prosecutor had already been
presented. 25 At the time of offering this
evidence, the Archbishop had not been
present, and indeed not even accused. Such
is a trial without either notice or hearing.
Its manifest unfairness was aggravated by
the circumstance that the testimony given
against the Archbishop in his absence was
that of indicted individuals squirming under
the arbitrary sword of Damocles of the
new people's democracy. 26
Fundamental Law and Fair Trial
There is no requirement that the crimi-
nal trials of one country be conducted ac-
cording to the canons of another. However,
there are minimum standards of fairness
to an accused, which when ignored and
violated, justify concern and even active
25 PATTEE, THE CASE OF CARDINAL ALOYSIUS
STEPINAC 54-55 (1953).
26 Ibid.
PUNISHMENT IN A FREE SOCIETY
intervention by civilized nations of the
world. The Dutchman, Grotius, writing in
the early seventeenth century, qualified the
general rule of non-intervention:
The case is different if the wrong is manifest.
If a tyrant ...practices atrocities towards
his subjects, which no just man can approve,
the right of human social connection is not
cut off in such a case.27
The German, Martens, maintained that
public opinion:
irresistibly compels governments to pro-
nounce their judgments and to take steps, as
soon as such truly deplorable phenomena
as religious persecutions or denials of the
civil rights of ... subjects of this or that de-
nomination make their appearance.2 8
The Frenchman, Fauchille, wrote:
Intervention is legitimate vis-a-vis a State
which is in a condition of anarchy or whose
institutions are actually inhumane; if a
State cannot impose upon others the form
of its government, it can at least demand
that they submit to a rule of law, in con-
formity with the principles of civilization.2 9
And Sir Robert Phillimore, Judge of the
High Court of Admiralty, and member of
the British Privy Council, insisted upon the
right of intercession to uphold religious
equality by "remonstrance, by stipulation,
by a condition in a Treaty concluding a War
waged upon other grounds." 30
Since the sixteenth century, states have
intervened to uphold the human rights of
27 I1 GROTIus, DE JURE BELLI ET PACis 308, 440
(Whewell transl. 1853).
28 11 MARTENS, VOLKERRECHT: DAS INTERNATION-
ALE RECHT DER NATIONEN 111 (Berlin, 1883).
29 1-1 FAUCHILLE, TRAITE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIQUE 572 (8th ed., Paris, 1922).
30 1 PHILLIMORE, COMMENTARIES UPON INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 622 (3d ed., London, 1879).
freedom of worship by treaty, diplomatic
protest, withdrawal of diplomatic represen-
tation, and outright non-recognition of the
persecuting sovereign.31 The government
of the United States has recognized the
principle of freedom of worship in the in-
ternational community, and has frequently
protested to other states that have persecu-
ted its own subjects on religious grounds.32
Indeed, the federal nature of the govern-
ment of the United States offers a concrete
and systematic example of the application
of fundamental law to the criminal pro-
cedures of sovereign states. In the first eight
amendments to the Federal Constitution
there are set forth twenty-five specific pro-
tections that comprise the Bill of Rights.
Seventeen of these guarantees relate to fair
criminal procedure. These provisions, how-
ever, are restrictions on the federal gov-
ernment. They have no direct application
to the fifty sovereign states. Yet it is on
the state level that the bulk of responsibility
for the prosecution of crime rests. Since
1868, the Fourteenth Amendment has pro-
hibited states from depriving "any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." The due process clause
has provided a rule of fundamental law for
review of state criminal procedure. The
reviewing body is a federal one, the Su
31 BLUNTSCHLI, DAS MODERNE VOLKERRECHT DER
CIVILISIERTEN STAATEN 270 (3d ed. 1878); BOR-
CHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS
ABROAD 14 (1915).
32 E.g., on behalf of Jewish racial and religious
minorities: President Van Buren to Turkey
(1840); Hamilton Fish, Secretary of State, to
Roumania (1872); James G. Blaine, Secretary of
State, to Russia (1881); John Sherman, Secretary
of State, to Persia (1897); John Hay, Secretary
of State, to Roumania (1902); President Roose-
velt to the Third German Reich (1938). JANOW-
SKY, INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF GERMAN RACIAL
POLICIES 6-32 (1937); N. Y. Times, Nov. 15, 16,
1938.
preme Court of the United States.
The principle of due process does not
incorporate all of the guarantees in the first
eight amendments. The principle exacts
from the states a criminal procedure that
accords even to the lowliest and most out-
cast all that is "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty."'33 Obviously, in the name
of fundamental law, federal intervention
in state criminal proceedings has been the
exception and not the rule. For the first
fifty-five years of the due process clause,
in the Fourteenth Amendment, the Su-
preme Court did not disturb a single state
criminal conviction on constitutional
grounds, except ones involving denial of
equal protection of the law for discrimina-
tion along racial lines in selection of jur-
ors.3 4 Since 1923, the year of first federal
intervention,35 this writer has been able to
find only fifty-seven instances for the next
thirty-five years of interference by the
Supreme Court with state criminal proceed-
ings on the grounds of denial of due proc-
ess.36 These instances have been sufficient
to indicate the minimum standards for
civilized criminal procedure implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty.
In 1923, the Supreme Court interfered
in a state conviction for murder of five
Negroes after a trial, in essential respects,
similar to that of Archbishop Stepinac. The
proceeding was dominated by a mob, and
33 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
See also Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
34 E.g., Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U.S. 226 (1904);
Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442 (1900); Bush v.
Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110 (1882); Neal v. Delaware,
103 U.S. 370 (1880); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U..S.
339 (1879); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S.
303 (1879).
35 Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
36 Ludwig, The Role of the Prosecutor in a Fair
Trial, 41 MINN. L. REV. 602, 603-04 (1957).
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though eminent counsel had been desig-
nated, there had been no preliminary con-
sultation with the accused. The Court held
that when "the whole proceeding is a
mask - that counsel, jury and judge were
swept to the fatal end by an irresistible wave
of public passion," then there is no due
process of law.37 A decade later, the Court
reversed the convictions of seven defend-
ants in the celebrated Scottsboro case,
solely because of inadequate representation
by counsel. Though counsel had been de-
signated and appeared in that case, the
Court noted that "a defendant, charged
with a serious crime, must not be stripped
of his right to have sufficient time to advise
with counsel and prepare his defense. '38
In the other instances of federal inter-
ference, the Supreme Court has required
that state criminal trials be open to the
public at large,3 9 that they be conducted
before judges who are impartial, 40 with evi-
dence that is neither coerced 4' nor sup-
37 Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923). This
was an appeal from a denial of habeas corpus by
a United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Arkansas. The Supreme Court could not
reverse the state conviction in this proceeding. The
Court directed the lower federal tribunal to hold
hearings. As a consequence, the state authorities,
without contesting the case further, commuted the
sentences and released the prisoners who had been
in custody for four years.
38 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 59 (1932).
3 9 1n re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
4 0 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
41 Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957); Leyra
v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954); Rochin v. Cali-
fornia, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); Harris v. South
Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949); Turner v. Pennsyl-
vania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949); Watts v. Indiana, 338
U.S. 49 (1949); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S.
401 (1945); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143
(1944); Vernon v. Alabama, 313 U.S. 547 (per
curiam), reversing 240 Ala. 577, 200 So. 560
(1941); Lomax v. Texas, 313 U.S. 544 (per cur-
iam), reversing 144 S.W.2d 555 (1941); White
v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530 (1940); Canty v. Alabama,
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pressed by the prosecution, 42 and that fair
post-conviction remedies be made available
by state law to the accused. 43 The conduct
defined by the state as criminal cannot be
vague, but must be clearly ascertainable in
advance of commission of the facts by the
accused.44 That conduct also cannot in-
fringe freedom of worship, 45 or liberty of
opinion.46
Against this background, the Acting
Secretary of State of the United States,
Dean Acheson, thus characterized the trial
of Archbishop Stepinac:
[W]e have for a long time been concerned
about civil liberties in Yugoslavia. You will
recall at the time we recognized the Govern-
ment of Yugoslavia, we drew their attention
309 U.S. 629 (1940); Chambers v. Florida, 309
U.S. 227 (1940); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S.
278 (1936).
42 Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
43 Jennings v. Illinois, 342 U.S. 104 (195 1); Young
v. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235 (1949).
44 Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95 (1948); Lanzetta
v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
45 Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951);
Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517 (1946); Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Taylor v. Missis-
sippi, 319 U.S. 583 (1943); Douglas v. City of
Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943); Martin v. City of
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Murdock v. Penn-
sylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Largent v. Texas,
318 U.S. 418 (1943); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S.
413 (1943); Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584
(1942); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939);
Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
46 Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 922 (1957); Ter-
miniello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); Saia v.
New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948); Winters v. New
York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); Craig v. Harney, 331
U.S. 367 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S.
331 (1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252
(1941); Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106
(1940); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88
(1940); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937);
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to what we thought was the undesirable situ-
ation in that field and reminded them of their
undertakings under the United Nations
Charter in which all of these matters are
specifically dealt with and urged that the
matter be rectified as soon as possible. We
have since recognition unhappily had to take
up a very considerable number of cases
with the Yugoslav Government where we
have felt that trials of our own citizens were
unfairly conducted. It is this aspect of the
Archbishop's trial which I am able to say
now concerns us .... It is the civil liberties
aspect of the thing which causes us con-
cern: aspects which raise questions as to
whether the trial has any implications look-
ing toward the impairment of freedom of
religion and of worship; the aspects of it
which indicate at least to the reporters who
reported it from the spot that the actual
conduct of the trial left a great deal to be
desired.
You will recall that under the Constitu-
tion and law of the United States fairness
of trial is guaranteed under the 14th amend-
ment, and the Supreme Court of the United
States has set aside as not being legal pro-
cedure at all trials in which the courtroom
has been dominated by feelings adverse to
the defendant by demonstrations of preju-
dice. That is deeply inherent in the Ameri-
can system, that the very essence of due
process of law is that in trials we shall lean
over backward in being fair to the defend-
ant, in the atmosphere in the courtroom, in
forbidding demonstrations of spectators, in
opportunity of facing and cross-examining
witnesses - all these matters seem to us to
be absolutely inherent in the matter of a fair
trial. It is that aspect of the thing ... which
causes us concern and deep worry. 47
The expression of "concern and deep
worry" regrettably did not ripen into pro-
test, cessation of economic and. military
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